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 1. Introduction1 
Ethnically motivated incidents in Vojvodina have influenced international debates about 
Serbia over the past few years. This working paper attempts to reach a better understanding of 
the scale and nature of the incidents in 2004. It argues that while the incidents have been 
alarming, their real significance lies in the broader problems they shed a light on. The acts of 
violence, graffiti and damage to sites associated with minority communities shed light on 
three particular aspects to be discussed in the working paper. First, the political elites and 
institutions in Serbia have been responding only slowly and under international pressue to the 
incidents, which attests to the challenges of majority-minority relations in Serbia. Second, the 
incidents reveal the strong attraction of nationalism to the youth which grew up under the 
Milošević regime. Third, a pattern of separate lives has become a feature of majority-minority 
relations in Vojvodina, as is already a problem in other regions of Serbia. Altogether, the 
incidents and their context suggest that nationalism and strained minority-majority relations 
are not merely a passing legacy of the Milošević era, but more deeply engrained and will 
remain a formidable obstacle if not tackled. 
  On 29 September 2005 the European Parliament passed a resolution declaring “that 
the Serbian authorities mostly turn a blind eye to the violence” in Vojvodina and accusing 
“the central and local authorities of Serbia” for having “failed to insure respect for 
fundamental human rights.”2 In addition, the resolution called on the pre-1990 political 
autonomy to be restored to Vojvodina. Shortly thereafter, the influential Serbian weekly NIN 
carried on its front  page a picture of the president of the main Hungarian party in Vojvodina, 
József Kasza, next to the headline “The Threat of Greater Hungary.”3 What had happened? 
Was a new conflict in the making? After a wave of incidents in 2004, few had been noted in 
2005. 
The rhythm and timing of the domestic and international response to the incidents in 
Vojvodina have been disharmonious over the past two years. When minorities became 
targeted in a series of incidents since late 2003, nobody outside of Vojvodina paid much 
attention. While it was first noted widely in Serbia in April 2004, international attention 
cumulated in September 2004 with a declaration by the European Parliament. The number of 
incidents in the mean time declined, whereas the topic received dramatic attention in 
                                            
1  The authors would like to thank Aleksandra Vujić for her helpful comments. 
2 European Parliament, Vojvodina: harassment of minorities, P6_TA(2004)0016, 29.9.2005. 
3   “Pretnja velije mađarske”, NIN, 20.10.2005. 
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September and October 2005. The Serbian media discussed the implied threats to the 
territorial integrity of Serbia and the simultaneity with the discussion on the status of Kosovo 
and possible independence for Montenegro. Minorities in Vojvodina and elsewhere in Serbia 
on the other hand noted their dissatisfaction with the state of minority rights. The violence in 
Vojvodina has been understood and responded to in contradictory ways. Either the story of 
the incidents is that of the failure of Serbian authorities and their implicit and explicit 
nationalism, or it is a tale of minorities trying to exaggerate a few incidents, often without any 
interethnic motivation, to either advance a more sinister agenda or for minority leaders to 
secure political power within their communities.  
Both narratives of the incidents and their meaning cannot explain either what the incidents 
mean or what dangers they pose. This working paper argues that there have been a 
considerable number of serious incidents in 2004 (and many fewer in 2005), which are indeed 
worrying for the future of Serbia. They are less disconcerting due to their character. Most 
incidents were in fact graffiti or damage to properties. Physical attacks were nearly 
exclusively confined to bar fights, which often cannot be qualified as ethnically motivated, 
beyond the fact that the participants belong to different communities. While all minorities in 
Serbia, and in Vojvodina in particular, have been targeted, from Roma and Albanians to 
Hungarians and Slovaks, most international attention has focused on the treatment of the 
Hungarian minority due to the successful lobbying by the kin state. At the same time other 
minorities continue to be more frequently subjected to attacks, in particular Roma. This 
working paper argues that the concern arises from a) the profile of the perpetrators; b) the 
degree of interethnic segregation revealed by the incidents; c) the weakness of state response, 
d) the scale of nationalist reflexes in the Serbian media and e) the inability for an unbiased 
and effective international response. The incidents shed a worrying light on the nature of 
interethnic relations in Serbia and the residue of nationalism, or rather as will be argued here, 
a new form of grassroots nationalism. These conclusions do not suggest that the incidents will 
again increase or lead to any kind of larger conflict. However, they suggest that similar waves 
of interethnic tension can occur elsewhere in Serbia and radicalize the political scene, 
especially in light of the refocusing on ‘status’ and ‘national’ questions in 2006 with the 
future of the state union and the final status of Kosovo at stake. 
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 2. Background 
Although Vojvodina has experienced many border changes, mass murder and the 
expulsion of whole population groups in the 20th century, it has been spared large scale 
violence and war in the 1990s. Having become part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes in 1918 after the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, this region was shaped by a 
distinct historical development. Vojvodina experienced a sharp demographic transformation 
during and after World War Two, first by the Holocaust which decimated the Jewish 
population in Vojvodina.4 After the war, the substantial German and parts of the Hungarian 
population were expelled by the victorious Partisan forces.5
Communist Yugoslavia encouraged new settlers to move from agriculturally 
disadvantaged areas in Croatia and Bosnia—often Partisans rewarded for their services—to 
Vojvodina. In a two-year period between mid-1945 and mid-1947 over 200,000 people 
moved to Vojvodina, around 90 percent of whom were Serbs and Montenegrins. This 
demographic shift and the new population in Vojvodina has become one of the key sources of 
tension in Vojvodina from the 1980s onwards. The rise to power of Slobodan Milošević 
began in 1987 over Kosovo. It was in Vojvodina, however, where he would be able to take 
control of another region of Yugoslavia for the first time. Originally Vojvodina (and Kosovo) 
were unable to exercise much autonomy from Serbia proper, but through constitutional 
amendments in 1968 and 1971, consolidated in the last Yugoslav constitution of 1974, the 
provinces acquired attributes similar to those the six republics. While formally subordinated 
to Serbia, the province of Vojvodina acted virtually like a separate republic, a source of 
dissatisfaction in the emerging Serbian nationalist discourse, which viewed the status of 
Vojvodina and Kosovo as deliberate attempts to weaken Serbia. When Kosovo Serbs, with 
logistical support by the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević, took to the streets of Novi 
Sad and later other towns and cities in Vojvodina, they protested against the ‘bureaucratic’ 
leadership in Vojvodina and for a dismantling of autonomy. Most of the protests in fact took 
place in towns with a majority of settlers who had moved to Vojvodina after 1945.6 There 
                                            
4  Parts of Vojvodina were controlled by Hungary, others by Croatia and part of the territory was governed 
by the local German population. Milica Mihailović. 2000. Jevreji na Jugoslovenskom tlu. Belgrade and 
Podgorica: Forum za etničke odnose i Centar za toleranciju i dijalog, pp. 63-69. 
5  Zoran Janjetović. 2000. Between Hitler and Tito. Disapearance of the Ethnic-Germans from Vojvodina. 
Belgrade. 
6  Emil Kerenji, “From October 1988 to October 2000: Vojvodina Under Milošević,” Sabrina P. Ramet, 
Vjeran Pavlaković (eds), Serbia Since 1989: Politics And Society Under Milosevic And After. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2005, pp. 350-380. 
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emerged a division between settlers–those who reportedly opposed the autonomy–and the 
established Serb population which had strongly supported provincial autonomy and was 
commited to inclusive multiethnic governance. This line of division, doubtless to a degree 
imagined, remained potent in the following years. After the Vojvodina leadership resigned in 
fall 1988 in the face of mass protests, the province was stripped of its autonomy and 
minorities and political opponents of the Milošević regime were marginalized. 
After World War Two, the wars of the 1990s brought about another major demographic 
shift in Vojvodina. Although Vojvodina had avoided the wars, it was the destination of a 
disproportionate number of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. Of the 379,135 refugees which 
fled to Serbia during the 1990s and still lived there in 2002, some 49.2 percent lived in 
Vojvodina, although the province only accounts for only 27.1 percent of the population of 
Serbia (without Kosovo). As nearly 93 percent of the refugees were Serbs, some 172,726 
Serbs had temporarily or permanently found a home in Vojvodina. With the exception of the 
city of Belgrade, only municipalities in Vojvodina had seen an influx of Serb refugees larger 
than 2 percent of the total refugee population. Nine municipalities of Vojvodina accommodate 
nearly a third of the entire refugee population, which amounts to the same share as the city of 
Belgrade.7
At the same time, the number of minorities declined during the 1990s. The three largest 
minorities—Hungarians, Slovaks and Croats—saw a significant decrease in numbers between 
the 1991 Yugoslav census and the Serbian census of 2002. Thus in 2002 the three minorities 
amounted to only between 76 and 89 percent of the 1991 population figures, a decline 
mirrored also by most smaller minorities with the only exception of Roma. Both due to the 
decline of minorities and self-declared Yugoslavs and the influx of refugees, the Serb 
majority increased from just below 57 to over 65 percent of the population.  
 
Table 1: Population Structure of Vojvodina, 1991, 2002 (only groups over 10,000 
included)8
 
 Census 1991 Census 2002 
 In numbers In % In numbers In % 
Ratio 1991/2002 
Serbs 1,143,723 56.79 1,321,807 65.05 1.16 
Hungarians 339,491 16.86 290,207 14.28 0.85 
Slovaks 63,545 3.16 56,637 2.79 0.89 
Croats 74,808 3.71 56,546 2.78 0.76 
Yugoslavs 174,295 8.65 49,881 2.45 0.29 
Montenegrins 44,838 2.23 35,513 1.75 0.79 
                                            
7  Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjiska prava Srbije i Crne Gore, Izbeglički korpus u Srbiji. Belgrade, 2004. 
8  Source: Zavod za statistiku, Srbija. 
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Roma 24,366 1.21 29,057 1.43 1.19 
Romanians 38,809 1.93 30,419 1.5 0.78 
Bunjevci 21,434 1.06 19,766 0.97 0.92 
Rusyns 17,652 0.88 15,626 0.77 0.89 
Macedonians 17,472 0.87 11,785 0.58 0.67 
Others and 
undeclared 
53,456 2.65 114,748 5.65 2.13 
Total 2,013,889  2,031,992   
 
During the 1990s, overt physical violence or the explicit threat thereof has been the 
exception in Vojvodina with the notable exception of the case of Hrtkovci and several other 
Croat-inhabited villages and towns.9 In Hrtkovci, members of the Serb Radical Party 
threatened the local Croat population, following the arrival of Serb refugees from Croatia in 
1991. A local SRS official took over control of the municipality illegally and published lists 
of undesirable inhabitants and changed the name to “Srbislavci” in an attempt to rid the town 
of its Croat-sounding name. Although state authorities did intervene, some 350 Croat families 
left between September and November 1992.10  
The absence of large scale organized violence in Vojvodina is hardly surprising 
considering that ethnic violence during the 1990s in former Yugoslavia was state-controlled, 
even if often carried out by paramilitary formations.11 The Serbian state, key in supporting the 
uprising of the Croatian and then later the Bosnian Serbs, had no interest in instigating this 
kind of violence in Vojvodina. Not only was the province under tight Serbian control, the 
absence of a clear challenge by minorities—a consequence of the numerical dominance of 
Serbs and moderate platform of minorities—made Vojvodina an unlikely target. In fact, the 
smaller minorities in the Vojvodina were often taken to ‘prove’ the government’s inclusive 
policies and justify repressive policies against Albanians in Kosovo. Notwithstanding the 
government’s half-hearted attempts at ‘show-casing’ minorities in the 1990s, all minorities 
found themselves in a difficult situation after 1988/90. First, the erosion of the rights of the 
province meant that minorities had reduced access to governing institutions. This factor is 
especially significant when considering that most minorities in the Vojvodina might be 
numerical relevant at the provincial level, but are marginal at the republican level. Secondly, 
the emphasis of most majority political parties in government and opposition on ‘national’ 
issues excluded minorities from mainstream politics.  
                                            
9  Humanitarian Law Centre, Human Rights Violations in the Territory of former Yugoslavia 1991-95. 
Belgrade, 1997, pp. 83-105. 
10  Ibid., pp. 9-12. 
11  See Florian Bieber, “Approaches to Political Violence and Terrorism in former Yugoslavia,” Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 5, No.1 (2003), pp. 39-51. 
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Calls for greater autonomy of Vojvodina were met by the government with suspicion 
and were quickly dismissed as being secessionist. Cooperation between minorities and 
majority opposition parties emerged only gradually during the 1990s. The Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija Srbije, DOS), which won the federal 
parliamentary and presidential elections in September 2000 against the Socialist Party of 
Serbia (Socijalistički partija Srbije, SPS), controlled by Slobodan Milošević, included the 
main Hungarian minority party, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (Savez vojvođanskih 
Mađara, SVM; Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség, VMSz) and received support from the 
organizations of smaller minorities. In the first reformist Serbian government, the SVM 
president, József Kasza, became deputy prime minister. In the provincial government, 
minorities were included, foremost representatives of the Hungarian community. In the first 
years of democratic transition some competences were returned to Vojvodina in a series of 
legal reforms, in particular through the so-called Omnibus law which delegated 
responsibilities in the field of labor, pensions, health, culture and education to the Vojvodina 
authorities. In the absence of a new Serbian constitution and because of stiff opposition to a 
further devolution of competences by the Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka 
Srbije, DSS) and other conservative parties, Vojvodina still lacks the autonomy it enjoyed in 
the period 1974-1990. 
Support for extreme nationalist parties reached a lowpoint in 2000. In the 
parliamentary elections in December 2000, the Serb Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, 
SRS) received between 9.11 % and 15.12 % and the Socialist Party between 8.46% and 
12.96% of the vote in the different districts of Vojvodina. In the subsequent elections 2002-
2004, including multiple (failed) presidential elections, parliamentary and local elections, the 
Radical Party succeeded in emerging as the single largest party in Vojvodina (see table 
below). The strength of the party has been the result of a) the fragmentation of the democratic 
parties, b) decreasing voter turn out, c) the consolidation of the anti-reform block with the 
Radical Party and d) the disappointment with the transition process.  
Since the voluntary surrender of its president, Vojislav Šešelj, in February 2003 to the 
ICTY, the party has adopted a generally less belligerent and more social populist agenda. It 
has not, however, abandoned its extreme nationalist platform and continues to reiterate its 
goal of creating a Serb nation-state including territories in Bosnia and Croatia (although 
nowadays supposedly through peaceful means). The party has not been able to translate its 
electoral success into political power in either the Serbian parliament or the assembly of 
Vojvodina. The party has, however, taken power in around 60 municipalities following the 
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2004 local elections, including a number of them in coalition with moderate parties (G17+) 
and minority parties (e.g. the Sandžak Democratic Party of Rasim Ljajić). 
 
Table 2: Election results in Vojvodina, 2002-200412
  SRS DS DSS SVM ZzT/ZzV PSS SPS G17 
votes 245,310  205,857     343,155 
 
Presidential 
Elections, 
29.9.2002, 1st 
round 
% 26.35  22.11     36.85 
votes 314,407 97,177 120,392 n/a 128,139 n/a 291,341 134,246 Parliamentary 
Elections, 
28.12.2003 
% 31.88 9.85 12.20 n/a 12.99 n/a 7.61 13.61 
votes 282,737 270,042 
 
74,344 
 
  140,042    Presidential 
Elections, 13. 
6. 2004, 1st 
round 
% 33.60 32.09 8.84   16.64   
Local 
Elections, 
19.9.2004 
% 27.83 21.28 7.05 4.35 2.08  6.93  
votes 137,238 102,481 33,872 46,343 44,572 33,842 30,864 24,763 Vojvodina 
Assembly13, 
19.9.2004 
% 29.05 21.69 7.17 9.81 9.43 7.16 6.53 5.24 
 
Minority and regionalist parties on the other hand saw their support decline. Ahead of 
the 2003 parliamentary elections, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarian formed a pre-election 
coalition with the regionalist League of Social Democrats in Vojvodina (Liga 
socijaldemokrata Vojvodine, LSV) and other minority parties. Although this joint “Coalition 
for Tolerance” fared relatively well in the Hungarian inhabited areas of Vojvodina it failed to 
enter parliament due to the five percent threshold and low support for regionalist parties. The 
previously dominant Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS) went into opposition, after 
loosing dramatically in the 2003 parliamentary elections amid a series of corruption scandals 
                                            
12  Not included are the failed Serbian presidential elections December 2002, November 2003, the second 
round of the first failed Serbian presidential elections 2002 and the second round of Presidential Elections 
2004. The main candidates for the presidential elections 2002 were Vojislav Šešelj, SRS; Miroljub Labus, 
G17plus. For the presidential elections in 2004, the candidates were Boris Tadić, DS, Tomislav Nikolić, 
SRS, Bogoljub Karić, PSS, and Dragan Maršičanin (DSS, supported by G17plus, SPO/NS). The coalition 
Together for Tolerance (Zajedno za Tolerancju, ZzT) included the SVM, the regionalist LSV and the 
Bosniak SDP. The coalition Together for Vojvovidna (Zajedno za Vojvodinu, ZzV) in 2004 was lead by 
the LSV but did not include the SVM. Source: Zavod za Statistiku Srbije, Dnevnik, 21.9.2005 
13  Results for the seats elected by PR, the other half (60) seats are elected in a two-round run off. 
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and an internal powerstruggle following the assassination of prime minister and party leader 
Zoran Djindjić in March 2003.  
The electoral success of the SRS and the end of the DOS government marked a watershed 
in post-Milošević Serbian politics. The more conservative climate was subsequently reflected 
in the new minority government of Vojislav Koštunica which received support from the 
Socialist Party of Serbia. In fact, already in 2002 with the escalating conflict between Zoran 
Djindjić and Vojislav Koštunica, radicals gained strength and the initial reforms came 
increasingly under fire. It is against this backdrop that Vojvodina experienced a serious 
increase in violent incidents direct against minorities. 
 
3. Interethnic Incidents and the Numbers Game  
As mentioned above, ethnically motivated violence was commonplace in parts of former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Although Vojvodina was spared the large-scale violence which 
other regions saw, attacks against minorities occurred throughout the 1990s. While the end of 
the Milošević regime in 2000 reduced ethnic tensions in Serbia, ethnically motivated violence 
did not entirely cease. Particularly striking is the increase of apparently ethnically motivated 
violence against minorities in Vojvodina in 2003 and 2004. The violence took place over a 
protracted period, had no apparent cause and a low level of intensity. Nobody was killed and 
most incidents involved exclusively graffiti and property damage. As a result, both the 
intensity and degree of these incidents has been difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, both the 
blurred line between ethnically motivated incidents and confrontations between individuals 
who happen to be from different ethnic groups and the lack of public information from the 
Ministry of Interior has rendered a detailed assessment of the incidents which plagued the 
province for over a year difficult. While data is available on the incidents, it lacks reliability 
and the sources appear to contradict one another. The incidents have been recorded from a 
range of organizations, including the Serbian Ministry of Interior, minority organizations, and 
Vojvodina institutions. The variations in the data cannot be reduced to the different political 
interests of those publishing it, but the nature of the incidents have often rendered them 
difficult to classify, as will be discussed later. The Serbian Ministry of Interior alone 
distributed at least two different sets of data. The first report covered the period 1 January - 31 
May 2004 and lists 294 incidents.14 The second report on the period 1 January - 31 August 
                                            
14  56 acts of vandalism of graveyards, 20 attacks at religious sites, 42 hate graffiti, 7 attacks at persons and 1 
anonymous threat. 129 of these incidents involved ethnic Albanians. The report dates to the 22.6.2004 
and is the one Predrag Marković, speaker of Belgrade’s parliament, refers to in his press statement in 
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2004 counts 150 incidents of which only 67 allegedly had an interethnic background.15 The 
Vojvodina Secretariat for Legislation, Administration and National Minorities16 operates with 
different numbers. It published a report on anti-minority incidents in January 2005 that refers 
to a total of 178 incidents in 2003 and 2004. A fourth data set has been compiled by the 
different national minority councils at the request of the parliament committee on interethnic 
relations. These lists, however, are not systematic and a number of smaller minorities lack the 
infrastructure for detailed reporting.17 Another more systematic effort has been undertaken by 
the Ombudsman for Vojvodina in his annual report, who noted some 76 incidents in the 
period January-September 2004.18 Finally, the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, a US-
based Hungarian lobbying group, noted some 122 incidents between January 2003 and 
August 2005.19
                                                                                                                                        
beginning of July. As Marković collected information on the incidents throughout June it is possible that 
the MUP made the report on Marković’s request. Contradicting this report, Minister of Interior Dragan 
Jočić claimed in a press conference in July 2004, that there had been a total of 44 attacks and 13 fights 
involving citizens with different ethnic backgrounds in all of Serbia (he noted that in Belgrade alone some 
17 attacks took place against Roma, suggesting that the number of attacks in Vojvodina would be not 
more than half of the total. “MUP Spreman da suzbije ispade,“ B92 Vesti, 20.7.2004.) In the beginning of 
September, the report was distributed on the joint session of the parliamentary Committees for Security 
and Minority Rights in Subotica. According to Pavel Domonji, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, 
Novi Sad, during the session Jočić said that only 67 incidents were ethnically motivated.  
15  18 physical attacks, 14 verbal attacks, 30 fights between individuals belonging to different groups, 
vandalism of graveyards and monuments, 26 attacks at religious sites, 6 damaging of other facilities, 21 
anonymous threats, 42 hate graffiti. It is argued that only 5 physical attacks involved ethnic Hungarians 
and only 67 incidents have the contours of inter-ethnic incidents due to the fact that they concerned 
individuals belong to different national minorities. Figures cited from OSCE, Background Report: Inter-
Ethnic Incidents in Vojvodina, Vienna, 13.10.2004, p.1. 
16  Secretaries are the equivalent of ministries at the Vojvodina level. 
17  Committee on Interethnic Relations, Aktuelna bezbednosa situacija na područiju Autonomne pokrajine 
Vojvodina, 2004  
18  Provincial Ombudsman, Report of the Provincial Ombudsman оn the activities, human rights practices 
and legal security in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina for 2004, Novi Sad 2005. Both the Belgrade 
Centre for Human Rights and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights have also listed a number of 
incidents against minorities in their reports. Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Human Rights in Serbia 
and Montenegro, Belgrade 2005 pp.324-333.  
19  Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, Anti-Minority Aggression Intensifies in Vojvodina, Serbia During 
2005, July 2005.  
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 Graph 1: Distribution of the Number of Incidents in 2004 
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The considerable variation between the different figures can be accounted for in a 
number of ways. In the first place there is a problem of how to define incidents and how to 
count them. For example, a large number of the incidents have been graffiti which is difficult 
to ‘count’ in a systematic manner. Secondly, there is the challenge of information. Not all 
victims report intimidations and threats to the police because they fear possible consequences 
and have no confidence that the police will investigate the case.20 While some larger 
minorities, in particular the Hungarian minority, have the organizational infrastructure to 
gather their own data, the national councils of the smaller minorities lack the resources and 
networks to collect such information. Thus, on one hand the numbers available are probably 
underestimating the real number of cases due to unreported incidents. On the other hand, 
numbers are likely to be partly too high, as some incidents are included in different statistics, 
which apparently have no ethnic background. Especially property destruction and bar brawls 
are notoriously difficult to judge whether they had an ethnic background or whether the 
participants merely happen to be from different ethnic backgrounds. Despite these 
methodological problems, the existing reports reveal the same tendency: a marked increase of 
anti-minority incidents in late 2003/early 2004 and a substantial decline by the end of 2004 
(see graph 1). 
Finally, not only the numbers in the reports and the responses to the incidents vary, but 
also the terms used to characterize them. In the public debate two terms have been particularly 
                                            
20  See Centre for the Development of Civil Society, Etnički incidenti u Vojvodina, October 2005. 
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widely used. Representatives of the state have described them largely as “isolated cases,”21 
some minority representatives and NGOs on the other hand have used the term “atrocities” as 
used by Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and a draft resolution of two Hungarian MEPs 
in September 2004. The figures below will show that the incidents were not isolated cases, 
but constituted a widespread phenomenon in Vojvodina. At the same time, the term 
“atrocities” is grossly exaggerated,22 as only a few cases included violence against persons 
and there is no indication of systematic physical attacks against minorities or the systematic 
destruction of property or cultural sites.  
 
a) Number and Character of Incidents 
The difficulties arising from the numbers of the incidents is closely intertwined with the 
nature of the types of acts committed against minorities. Of the materials available, the two 
most comprehensive and detailed sources have been issued by the Provincial Secretariat for 
Legislation, Administration and National Minorities and the Ombudsman for Vojvodina, 
Petar Teofilović. Here, we shall focus on the data of the Vojvodina Secretary, as it covers a 
longer time period. Its report covers the period from January 2003 - November 2004 and 
includes short descriptions of most incidents. The purpose of Korhec’s report was to inform 
Vojvodina’s cabinet and to advocate preventive measures against interethnic tensions and 
violence.23 The report lists 206 incidents over a 22 month period, with around 84 percent of 
the incidents occurring between December 2003 and November 2004.  
 
 
                                            
21  Foreign minister Vuk Drašković for example called the events “single incidents” and “isolated acts of 
violence”. “Položaj vojvođanskih Mađara: Činjenica, kampanja i komentari,” Vreme, 16.9.2004. 
22  The EP’s Ad-hoc mission to Vojvodina comes to the same conclusion concerning the term “atrocities.” 
European Parliament, Mission d’enquête réalisée par la délégation ad hoc du Parlament Européen en 
Voivodine et à Belgrade, 29.-31. Janvier. Rapport, Bruxelles, 2.3.2004. 
23  Unlike other state institutions, such as the Ministry of Interior, the provincial secretary has displayed 
greater sensitivity to the issues, explained in part by the fact that the Secretary Korhec is a member of the 
Hungarian minority and a member of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians.  
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 Graph 2: Incidents in Vojvodina by Categories and Total, 2003-424
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The above graph shows all incidents in total over the period covered by report and classifies 
them according to different categories. The graph indicates a sharp increase of incidents in 
December 2003. The December 2003 total is three times higher as in the previous month. It is 
significant that the increase began before the anti-Serb riots in Kosovo in March 2004 and 
cannot be explained as a mere reaction to these events. In March 2004 the curve reaches its 
peak and returns in April to the level of the previous months. This level is maintained until 
October 2004, when it declines.  
The individual types of incidents have been classified into six categories: 
- Category 1: Nationalist graffiti, leaflets, and posters; 
- Category 2: Damage to objects associated with one community, mostly 
religious objects, such as statues, tombstones or churches; 
- Category 3: Damage to private property; 
- Category 4: Verbal attacks and threats;  
- Category 5: Physical attacks; 
- Category 6: Fights.25 
 
Category 1: Nationalist graffiti, leaflets, and posters  
The first category – slogans and phrases in public spaces with nationalistic content – mostly 
includes graffiti, which often was sprayed on the walls of cultural institutions. It was directed 
                                            
24  Pokrajnski Sekretarijat za propise upravo i nacionalne manjine, APV, Izvršno Veče Vojvodine, 
Informacija o incidentima na nacionalnoj osnovi koji su se desili u Vojvodini u 2003. i u 2004. godini, 
10.1.2005.   
25  The differentiation between physical attacks and brawls was made because in brawls it is often very 
difficult to assess to what extent they were ethnically motivated. 
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against one minority or expressed general Serbian nationalism. Alarmingly violent language 
is frequently used such as: “Death to the Hungarians,” “We will kill the Hungarians,” ”Death 
to Nonserbs,” and “Hungarians under the ice.” Often the graffiti demands that Albanians, 
Roma, Jews and even Chinese leave Serbia (“Napolje sa kinezima”, “Napolje sa šiptarima,” 
etc). There were some graffiti and posters with Hungarian nationalist content often referring 
to the Treaty of Trianon. The list of graffiti is probably the most incomplete. Often it remains 
unclear when it appeared and the perpetrators were seldom identified. Furthermore, 
quantifying graffiti is most difficult, as often large areas are covered overnight by graffiti by 
apparently the same persons with similar messages. In total, there have been some 61 
instances of nationalist or anti-minority graffiti between January 2003 and November 2004. It 
is furthermore important noting the prolific use of graffiti in other region of Serbia, such as in 
Belgrade to promote a nationalist agenda. In particular supporters of the Serb Radical Party 
have made extensive use of graffiti in the electoral campaigns over recent years. 
 
Category 2: Damage to Community Objects 
The second category covers the damage to objects with symbolic meaning, particularly of 
religious buildings. Two kinds of incidents are typical. Often church windows were smashed, 
for example the windows of the Adventist churches in Zrenjanin, Srbobran, Novi Sad and 
Sremska Mitrovica, as the Orthodox church in Novi Sad and the Protestant church in Sombor. 
In most cases perpetrators were not identified.  
Secondly, tombstones and other objects in graveyards were damaged. A representative case is 
the Catholic graveyard in Sombor, in which 20 crosses and tombstones were desecrated at the 
beginning of July 2004.  
Frequently the target were churches and cemeteries associated with minorities. Nevertheless, 
a number of incidents involved also religious minorities, such as Jehova’s Witnesses.26 In a 
few cases, Serbian Orthodox churches have been targeted. 
In a number of cases, cemeteries were desecrated in towns with both Serb and minority 
inhabitants where the cemetery could not be symbolically ‘assigned’ to any community.27 In 
total, the number of incidents is the approximately same as graffiti. 
                                            
26  For a comprehensive list see Branko Bjelajac, “Serbia: Increased attacks on religious minorities,” 
F18News, 9.6.2005. Available at: http://www.forum18.org 
27  Closer examination of the tombstones in question might allow for a clearer identification of the target, but 
is not provided in the report. 
 13 
 
Category 3: Damage to private property 
The number of incidents (41) which cover damage to private property is largely related to the 
riots in reaction to the violent riots in Kosovo in March 2004. The targets were shops, 
bakeries and houses belonging to Albanians or where rioters thought they belonged to 
Albanians, but belonged to either Roma or other minorities. According to the Ministry of 
Interior in the period 17-19 March 2004, 54 Albanian or alleged Albanian objects (shops, 
apartments) were damaged in Novi Sad alone. In Sombor, the police registered 35 cases.28 
This type of attacks continued on a lower level in April and May 2004. In addition to the 
difference in terms of the trigger (Kosovo) to other incidents, the attacks against allegedly 
Albanian properties were committed ‘publicly’, i.e. by large mobs and in view of the public, 
unlike much of the other categories of incidents. 
 
Category 4: Verbal attacks and threats  
The fourth category, verbal attacks, threats and other forms of discrimination constitutes the 
smaller share of the overall incidents. These include anonymous telephone threats against 
some journalists and politicians. It is likely that many verbal attacks were not reported, 
especially when directed against Roma. 
 
Category 5: Physical attacks 
The report lists 18 cases of physical attacks.29 Most of them took place in May and June 2004. 
The victims were nearly always young Hungarians, beaten up by young Serbs. This was the 
case in beginning of May, when a 17 year old pupil on his way home from school was beaten 
up by a group of six or seven young Serbs in the center of Subotica.  
 
Category 6: Fights 
Finally, the sixth category covers more than ten bar brawls and fights, the so-called ‘kafanske 
tuče’, which are listed in the report. They largely took place in the period from May to August 
2004. In most cases Hungarians and Serbs were involved, but there are also reports on fights 
between Serbs and Slovaks in and around the Slovak village Lug. In most cases the fights and 
brawls took place at private parties or in bars. Alcohol was involved and it is difficult to 
assess to what extent they had an interethnic background.  
                                            
28  Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova Republike Srbije, Uprava policije. Informacija o međunacionalnim 
ekcesima gde su identifikovani izvršioci u 2003. i 2004. godini, 2.7.2004, p.3. 
29  It is surprising that the case of Zoran Petrović is included in the report since it had no interethnic 
background and was reported in detail in the press. The inclusion of the Petrović case points to some 
weaknesses in the quality of the report. Here the case was not included.  
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 As the data suggests, ethnically motivated incidents are not new in Vojvodina, but took place 
at regular intervals in most categories before late 2003. Between December 2003 and October 
2004, however, the increase of such incidents is dramatic.  
Altogether, the most frequent types of incidents were the ones described in category one and 
two, i.e. graffiti and damage to minority community property, accounting for nearly two 
thirds of all incidents.  
When compared with other countries, the number of incidents does not stand out 
particularly.30 In Austria for example, with approximately four times the population of 
Vojvodina, some 436 complaints for prohibited racist/xenophobic acts were recorded for 
2003. In the Czech Republic, some 236 racist crimes for 2003 and 209 for January through 
August 2004 have been officially registered.31 The total of 173 incidents for the one-year 
period December 2003-November 2004 thus constitutes a considerably higher number than in 
Austria and Czech Republic, but in no way amounts to a dramatic departure from racist 
violence/crime in the two countries. The number of incidents per 100,000 inhabitants thus 
ranges from 2.3 in the Czech Republic in 2003 to 5.3 in Austria for the same year and 8.5 in 
Vojvodina. With numbers 60 percent higher than in Austria and nearly at a quarter of those 
incidents that took place in the Czech republic, the scale of incidents is alarming but certainly 
within a range of violence which can be found in current EU members.32 The key in 
understanding the significance in the ethnically motivated violence in Vojvodina in 2004 lies 
thus not in the numbers alone, but in the repercussions on society and interethnic relations at 
large; the incidents on their own in fact revealed considerable weakness on the side of the 
state in its willingness to tackle anti-minority violence. 
 
b) Victims  
The incidents in Vojvodina have been generally been described as targeting minorities. 
To be more precise, one should qualify them as being interethnic and nationalist incidents. 
Long-established minorities were the general target of the attacks in 2004. In addition to 
traditional minorities, some of the graffiti and damage to property targeted new religious 
movements. In addition, also members of the majority have become victims or been targeted. 
                                            
30  There are many difficulties in cross-country comparisons of such incidents in terms of data collection, 
definition of what constitutes a racist incident, etc. Here, the example of Austria and the Czech Republic 
are given as both do have a good state reporting mechanism. 
31  European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States. A 
Comparative Overview of Findings from the RAXEN National Focal Points Reports 2001-2004, Vienna 
2005, p. 123, 210. Available at: http://www.eumc.eu.int. 
32  In Austria in 1999, some 717 incidents were recorded, just slightly less than in Vojvodina in 2004.  
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In most cases, these incidents involved bar fights between members of different groups. All 
the numbers regarding victims are, as other data regarding the incidents, to be considered with 
care, as many incidents remain unreported.  
In the majority of the cases the victims were Hungarians, followed by religious 
minorities. Partly these are small religious communities such as the Baptists and the 
Adventists. Partly, violence was directed against Protestant and Catholic churches, which are 
connected to the Hungarian or Croat minority or other smaller national minorities. There has 
also been a clear chronological link to the targeting of some groups.  
In March 2004 the victims were predominantly Albanian or communities which served 
as substitute targets, as elsewhere in Serbia. Whereas in Belgrade and Niš, the targets were 
mosques, mostly frequented by Bosniaks/Muslims. In Vojvodina, the primary targets besides 
Albanians were Ashkali. 
 
Table 3: Targets of Interethnic Incidents, January 2003-November 200433
1. Hungarians 82 8. Rusyns 3 
2. Croats 19 9. Ashkali 2 
3. Serbs 15 10. Bunjevci 1 
4. Albanians 14 11. Gorani 1 
5. Roma 12  12. Germans 1 
6. Jews 7 13. Against minorities in general  6 
7. Slovaks 6 14. Unclear 9 
 
Among the victims of the other incidents were minorities which had not before been targets of 
nationalism incidents like Slovaks and Rusyns. In the past, incidents have targeted larger 
minorities, such as Hungarians, Croats or Roma in Vojvodina. The smaller minorities had not 
been targeted either because they had not been perceived as a possible threat because of their 
small number or because their community was not associated with the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia. Finally, as mentioned earlier, smaller minorities are often less visible and not the 
subject of pronounced ethnic stereotypes and surveys fail to indicate significant ethnic 
distance among Serbs to these groups. Nevertheless, in course of the anti-minority incidents 
in 2004, members of the smaller minorities became targets. The National Council of the 
Slovak Minority reports for example that the village Lug in Srem (Southeastern Vojvodina) 
was frequently attacked by groups of the neighboring village and 15 fights took place in 
                                            
33  Based on the data from the Secretary of Vojvodina for Regulations, Administration and National 
Minorities. The category of religious minorities includes acts of violence against religious minority 
institutions, which in many cases are associated with specific national minorities. In a series of cases, 
however, New Religious Movements, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, were targeted. 
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March and April 2004 alone.34 In addition to the number of the incidents, the fact that small 
minorities became targets of Serbian nationalism points to a new dynamic in nationalism.  
 
c) Perpetrators  
Statistics and data on the number and targets of the incidents, as outlined above, remain 
sketchy and often unreliable. The data on perpetrators is even less reliable than on the 
incidents. One report from the Ministry of the Interior is the only source available (in the 
following MUP report).35 This report was distributed at the joint session of the Serbian 
Parliamentary Committee for Security and the Committee for Interethnic Relations, which 
took place in Subotica in September 2004. It contains a list of approximately 45 incidents 
with the names and ages of the alleged perpetrators and the charges against them. Most of the 
identified perpetrators were between 15 and 25 years old.  
On the basis of press coverage and the victims’ reports to the Nation Council of the 
Hungarian Ethnic Minority the council’s secretary, László Varga, estimates that 
approximately a quarter of the perpetrators were refugees or from refugee families 
respectively.36 Approximately 200,000 refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
well as IDPs from Kosovo live in Vojvodina. While there is no data on whether the 
perpetrators were refugees, it is often mentioned that refugees participated in the incidents.37 
It is impossible to estimate to what extent the refugees contributed to the escalation of 
violence in Vojvodina in 2004, but the interethnic violence and the general process of 
radicalization in Vojvodina, which manifests itself in the electoral success of the Serb Radical 
Party cannot be reduced to being an imported problem. In particular, the fact that most 
refugees have resided in Vojvodina for a decade or longer, if they came from Bosnia and 
Croatia, suggests that the social origin of the perpetrators, if they were to be often refugees, 
cannot explain the timing and nature of the incidents. In fact, when considering the 
                                            
34  Nacionalni Savet slovačke nacionalne Manjine, Informacije o incidentima, koji su se dogodili u pojedinim 
vojvođanskim mestima naseljenim slovacima i o kojima je informisan Nacionalni savet Slovačke 
nacionalne manjine, 13.5.2004.  
35  Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova Republike Srbije, Uprava policije, op. cit., p.1-2. 
36  László Varga, Interview, Secretary of the National Council of the Hungarian Ethnic Minority, Subotica, 
3.3.2005.  
37  The head of the EP’s ad-hoc mission, Doris Pack, stated after her visit to Vojvodina that the refugees in 
Vojvodina were not used to live in a multicultural environment and needed to be educated on this issue. 
This statement was considered as offensive and refugee organizations protested. Radenko Popić, the 
director of the committee for the help of refugees in Vojvodina said that Pack’s comments were offensive 
and not true. Popić stressed that most of the refugees come from particularly multiethnic regions in 
Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina and have no need for education in this area. See “Popić: Uvredljiva 
izjava Doris Pak,” B92, 01.02.2005. The later published report of this mission deals with the issue in a 
more sensitive way by stressing especially the refugees’ difficult economic situation. See “Fact-Finding 
Mission by the European Ad Hoc Delegation to Voϊvodina and Belgrade (28-31 January 2005) Report”. 
Brussels: European Parliament, 2 March 2005. 
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geographic distribution of the incidents and the regions of Vojvodina  having the largest share 
of population from refugee communities, no clear correlation is detectable (see maps in 
annex). Furthermore, most refugees moved into predominantly Serb municipalities, whereas 
municipalities with a strong minority population received considerably less refugees.38 At the 
same time, the fact that 49.1 % of all refugees live in Vojvodina and that the social and 
economic profile of this community resembles more that of Roma than of the majority 
population suggests a conflict potential which doubtlessly affected the incidents.39 Not only 
the economic situation distinguishes the refugee population from the rest, social relations 
remain difficult and in many municipalities of Vojvodina relations between the established 
population and refugees are tense. These tensions only sometimes coincide with ethnic 
differences, for example in the case of Serb refugees from Croatia and Hungarians from 
Vojvodina, but often lack ethnic connotations.  
Another question concerning the perpetrators is to what extent they were organized. At 
the beginning of the debate there were some claims that the Serbian secret service stood 
behind the incidents.40 Other theories claimed that the incidents were instigated by the Serb 
Radical Party to polarize the political climate and gain support in the upcoming local elections 
and elections to the Vojvodina assembly.41 Supporters of this theory argue that the incidents 
decreased quickly after the elections and that the Serb Radical Party did very well in the 
elections. What contradicts this explanation is the fact that voters in Vojvodina had already in 
the December 2003 elections supported the Radicals more than elsewhere. It is well 
imaginable that some of the incidents—especially those where perpetrators were not 
identified such as church window smashing or graffiti—were organized. There is, however, 
no conclusive evidence to support this. It is argued elsewhere that incidents of such a large 
scale could not happen without coordination. When considering the reports of the incidents 
this argument is not convincing. It appears that most of the incidents happened spontaneously 
or involved a very low organizational level of small groups that were not connected to one 
another. The only exceptions are the demonstrations after the events in Kosovo. These clearly 
                                            
38  Municipalities with a Hungarian majority have a refugee share of the population between 0.97% (Senta) 
and 7.26% (Bačka Topola), Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, Data on the Hungarian National 
Minority in the Republic of Serbia, 2005, unpublished Report to the European Parliament on file with the 
author. 
39  UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, The Strength of Diversity. Belgrade 2005, p. 29. The reasons 
for the large number of refugees lies in a) the geographic proximity to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
b) family ties due to the wave of Serb settlers from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina after World War 
Two (who took over properties from expelled Germans); and c) due to the relative wealth of the region. 
Information materials of the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights.  
40  “Kasa optužio BIA za pojavu nacionalistickih grafita,” B92, 2.4.2004; “Napadi na Madjare uz podršku 
vlada,” B92, 10.6.2004; “Vlada da spreči napade na manjine,” B92, 10.6.2004. 
41  Pavel Domonji, Interview, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Novi Sad, 23.3.2005.  
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had been organized and the violence in their aftermath must have been expected by the 
organizers.42  
In attempt to reduce the significance of the incidents, officials in Belgrade often stress 
that perpetrators were minors, drunk, and known troublemakers.43 Some NGOs and minority 
organizations have challenged this interpretation claiming that there was coordination of the 
incidents and that the perpetrators were not only teenagers. However, perpetrators were 
neither ‘only’ drunk under age or instrumentalized puppets of political actors. The fact that 
most of the perpetrators were between 15 and 25 years old does not reduce the seriousness of 
the acts committed but makes them even more alarming, as it indicates a considerable 
readiness for violence among the youth. This is not a specific problem of Vojvodina. In 
March 2004 after the unrests in Kosovo the mosques in Belgrade and Niš were set on fire and 
a number of other targets were damaged. The profile of the perpetrators in these cases largely 
matches those in Vojvodina, both during the attacks on minorities in March and the incidents 
throughout 2004. 
The age profile of most perpetrators draws attention to the broader phenomena of 
nationalism and violence among youth. This debate took place in Serbia in early 2005 in 
regard to violence between school children after a series of incidents in which one pupil was 
beaten to death by fellow pupils. The incidents brought attention to a long-standing pattern of 
high juvenile crime.44 Surveys indicate a high degree of violence in schools, confirmed by 
both state institutions and civil society.45 There has not, however, been a dramatic change 
since 2000, at least at the level of statistics. According to official statistics, the number of 
criminal offenses committed by juveniles during the period 1999-2003 peaked in 2001 and 
declined afterwards.46 While the youth of the perpetrators has been used as an argument 
against the seriousness of the crimes, this fact actually sheds a troubling light on society in 
Serbia today. The perpetrators and their generation were not active participants in the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, but rather grew up during the violent 1990s. For the generation 
under 20, Yugoslavia no longer constitutes a concrete personal experience. This includes 
limited travels to other parts of former Yugoslavia, sanctions and international isolation, as 
                                            
42  Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Indifference. Violence against Minorities in Serbia, October 2005, pp. 
14-23. 
43  Vreme 13.1.2005, p. 18; “Koštunica: Incidenti su pojedinačni,” B92, 8.9.2004; “Koštunica i Labus o 
potezu Budimpešte,” B92, 9. 9.2004. 
44  See Davor Konjikusic, “School’s Out, But Violence Is In,” Southeast European Times, 27.6.2005. 
45  According to a survey by the Centre for Policy Studies, pupils report in 18.1% of primary and 12.5% of 
secondary schools other pupils bringing arms to school. 14.5% of pupils in primary and 17.9% in 
secondary schools know of cases when pupils beat teachers (vice versa the ratio is 21.9% and 12.5%). 
Milan Nikolić. 2005. Education and National Minorities in Serbia. Belgrade: Centre for Policy Studies, 
p. 16.  
46  See Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, webrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu. 
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well as hyperinflation, war and an extreme nationalist social environment. The degree of 
isolation and its impact on the world view of this generation constitutes a troubling picture. A 
2004 survey by the Student Union suggested that approximately 70 % of all students have not 
left the country (including to neighboring ex-Yugoslav republics).47 A broader survey among 
the Serb population confirms this trend, with only 51.5% of 15 to 25 year-olds never having 
been abroad. Of those who have been abroad, only 31.1% did so more than once. Among all 
age groups over 15, the youngest group has traveled the least abroad, whereas among the 40-
59 year olds around three quarters have been abroad. Obviously, the comparison is inherently 
problematic, as traveling is a cumulative experience, meaning that with age more 
opportunities arise to have traveled during ones’ lifetime.48 At the same time, the curve of 
citizens who traveled abroad clearly correlates the different generational experiences in regard 
to free travel during the 1970s and 1980s and the isolation of the 1990s.49 This lack of 
exposure to other cultures and countries does have an affect on the world view of the 
generation. As a recent UNDP study on diversity in Serbia has documented, the highest level 
of ethnocentrism in Serbia can be found among 20-23 year-olds, followed by the over 60 
year-olds. 
Overall, ethnic distance has decreased since the 1990s. However, the decline has been 
far from linear and clear when considering the post-Milošević era; levels remain alarmingly 
high. 
 
Table 4: Attitudes of the majority towards key minorities 
 Albanians Muslims/ 
Bosniaks 
Roma Hungarians Croats 
Trust in  14 24 41 36 28 
Trust in Loyalty of  13 23 50 36 25 
Rejecting Minorities…      
as citizen 43 28 11 16 25 
as neighbor 52 34 25 21 32 
as friend of child 50 35 29 23 30 
as boss 59 45 41 35 45 
marrying a close relative 80 73 73 57 64 
(Source: Strategic Marketing, 2004) 
 
Interestingly, the social attitudes towards all key minorities improved in regard to earlier 
polling conducted in 2002, but in fact worsened since 2003.50 The decline in attitudes towards 
                                            
47  Zelimir Bojovic. 2005. Serbische Studenten sollen Europa kennen lernen, Deutsche Welle, 19. July. 
48  On the other hand, traveling to other parts of former Yugoslavia today would not have qualified as 
foreign travel for those traveling there before 1991. 
49  UNDP, op. cit., p. 41. 
50  Strategic Marketing Research & International Republican Institute. 2005. Public opinion poll: Attitudes 
towards ethnic minorities. Summary of the Key findings. Belgrade. See also UNDP, op. cit., p.35. 
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minorities is a stark warning that democratic transition and the end of armed conflict does not 
per se lead to improved interethnic relations. The decline since 2003 can be explained by a 
combination of a number of factors. Firstly, there has been a conservative backlash since 
2003, expressing itself in the revival of the Serb Radical Party and the more conservative 
government in power since 2004. Furthermore, the interethnic incidents in 2004 in Vojvodina 
have been highlighted by some mainstream media in an attempt to accuse minorities and their 
political leadership of exploiting the incidents. Finally, the riots in Kosovo in March 2004 
against Serbs worsened interethnic relations in Serbia, not only towards Albanians, but also 
towards Muslims. 
The perpetrators of the incidents constitute a too small part of the population of Vojvodina to 
draw conclusions on the larger state of society. At the same time, the social environment of 
the young generation and their nationalist and ethnocentric views suggest that the incidents 
have to be seen in this particular light. Thus, the violence in Vojvodina has to be seen as an 
expression of a particular type of nationalism associated with the post-Milošević era, rather 
than reducing it to a hold-over from the Milošević period. 
 
4. Responses to the Incidents 
In attempting to understand the meaning of the incidents in Vojvodina for Serbia, a focus 
has to be placed on the ways in which these have been confronted (or not) by different actors. 
A key criticism of minority groups has been the passivity of the state, whereas Serb media 
and politicians repeatedly accused minority politicians of instrumentalizing (or even inflating) 
the incidents for their own political goals. Here we will discuss the response of police and 
judiciary, the political elite and institutions in Belgrade and Novi Sad, as well as that of the 
key minority actors, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians and the involvement of the kin 
state Hungary.  
 
d) Police and Judiciary 
A key source of contention in regard to the incidents in Vojvodina has been the police 
response and the court processes involving the cases. The police have been repeatedly 
accused by Human Rights Organizations and minorities for failing to react appropriately to 
the incidents. Victims reported that the police did not act on their behalf and failed to protect 
them. The police apparently overlooked the nationalistic motives for the violence and 
considered the incidents as mere vandalism.  
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During March 2004 in Belgrade, Niš and Novi Sad, the police response was patchy and 
problematic. Leaked transcripts of telephone conversations between the Minister of Police, 
Dragan Jočić, and the head of the Belgrade police at the time, Milan Obradović, suggest that 
the minister did not recognize the seriousness of the anti-minority violence on the night of the 
17-18 March 2004.51 In Novi Sad, in the same night the police did not prevent the 
demonstrators from damaging the house of the Muslim community, Vojvodina’s government 
and several Albanian bakeries. At the same time, they managed to block the demonstrators’ 
way to a Roma and Ashkali settlement of the same mob. In fact, in a coordinated effort 
between police and the Vojvodina government, the police concentrated efforts to protect the 
Ashkali settlement rather than protect the other buildings in an attempt to reduce risk to 
human life.52  The police were unable to block a similar attack the following night in Veliki 
Rit, a poor suburb of Novi Sad, and to protect its mostly Ashkali and Roma inhabitants. 
According to the MUP report,53 during these events 24 persons were arrested. As of April 
2005 nobody had been sentenced, although the demonstration was taped by police.54  
The aforementioned MUP report contains only information on charges against 
perpetrators, but fails to provide information on further proceedings although some cases took 
place in summer 2003 a year before the report was written. According to the National Council 
of the Hungarian Minority and the Provincial Secretary Tamás Korhec, it has been difficult to 
obtain information from the judiciary on this issue.55 A recent report by Human Rights Watch 
suggests that generally misdemeanor, rather than criminal charges were levied against 
perpetrators.56 In only one case was a perpetrator accused of inciting ethnic, religious and 
racial hatred.57 During the period January 2003 to June 2004, the interior ministry reported 
that the police had launched 50 criminal investigations in what the ministry noted were some 
49 interethnic incidents. The police cleared up some 20 cases and arrested three persons. Most 
of the arrests were for desecration of cemeteries (15), property damage (8), participation in 
                                            
51  “Džamija gori, Jočić se cešlja,” Blic, 8.6.2005. 
52  Centre for the Development of Civil Society, Ethnic Incidents in Vojvodina after Internationalization. 
Zrenjanin 2005, p.26. 
53  See 2.1.  
54  Tamás Korhec, Interview, Vice-President and Provincial Secretary for Legislation, Administration and 
National Minorities, Novi Sad, 23.3.2005. 
55  Interviews with Korhec and Lásló Varga, Secretary of the National Council of the Hungarian Ethnic 
Minority, Subotica, 3.3.2005. 
56  On the other hand, the five young Hungarians who were sentenced for the beating of a Serb in the town of 
Temerin (see below) in June 2004 to jail sentences between 10-15 years. The sentencing has by criticized 
by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians as being discriminatory. “Kasa: Pred Evropskim sudom kršenje 
prava manjina u Vojvodina,” Danas, 10.11.2005.  
57  Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 26. The ministry in its own report apparently takes a narrow approach 
and notes that none of the physical attacks on Hungarians were motivated by ethnic, religious or racial 
hatred. Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova Republike Srbije, Uprava policije, op. cit., p.1. 
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fights (2), threatening peace (2) violent behavior (2) and inflicting light physical injury (2). 
However, in most cases, perpetrators were sentenced to relatively low financial penalties for 
breach of public order and peace. The ministry notes some 10 misdemeanor cases against 39 
persons in 2003 and in the first half of 2004.58 According to a 2005 report on incidents 
involving the Hungarian minority of the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, 28 criminal 
charges were brought against individuals regarding offenses, including 11 Serbs and three 
Hungarians and 20 charges were brought forward on offenses against public order and peace, 
including 39 Serbs and 21 Hungarians. With the decline of incidents in 2005, the number of 
charges brought forth between January and August 2005 decreased to four for criminal acts 
and two for offenses against public order and peace, involving four Hungarians, three Serbs 
and one Muslim.59
The relative leniency of the police, at least until October 2004, and of the judiciary is in 
part the consequence of the fact that many perpetrators are underage and that courts and 
police generally did not consider or underestimated the ethnic dimension of the crime. 
Beyond these two aspects, the originally weak state response highlights two particular 
problems.  
First, the public administration, in particular the police, has not been fully reformed since the 
end of the Milošević regime. As a consequence, nationalism among some staff and lack of 
professional awareness of the sensitivity of the incidents remains a problem. Furthermore, 
minorities remain underrepresented in public service. As the table below highlights, 
Hungarians, while constituting over 14 % of the population of Vojvodina, constitute only 
slightly more than five percent of the police force and public prosecutors.60
Table 5: Share of Hungarians in key sectors of the public administration in Vojvodina61
Population of Vojvodina (2002) 14.28%
Municipal Courts 31
District Courts 4
Judges 
Commercial Courts 4
8.80%
Public prosecutors and deputy public prosecutors 5.43%
Employees in the Ministry of Interior (including 
Police)  5.81%
Members of the Provincial Parliament 20.00%
Members of the Provincial Council  23.80%
Employees in municipal and city administrations in 
Vojvodina 
14.99%
                                            
58  Ibid., p.1-2. 
59  Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, Data on the Hungarian National Minority, op. cit. 
60 It is important to note that the small share of Hungarians in police is not only based on the Milošević 
legacy, but also on the lack of interest among minority members of joining the police forces. 
61  Source: Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, Data on the Hungarian National Minority, op. cit. 
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 Second, the political leadership did not attribute sufficient importance to the incidents and did 
not make the investigation and prosecution of ethnically motivated violence a priority until 
these had received substantial international attention. In regard to the March 2004 violence, 
both the Minister of Interior and the judge in the case against defendants for the burning of 
the mosque in Niš expressed understanding for protests, if not the violence itself in light of 
the violence in Kosovo.62
The weak state responses doubtlessly encouraged the perpetrators and contributed to a 
social atmosphere in which nationalistic violence appeared to be tolerated. According to the 
president of the Hungarian National Council, after the visit of Prime Minister Koštunica to 
Subotica in September 2004, where he met with local authorities of police, judiciary and 
administration, the attitude of the police improved noticeably. This coincides with a sharp 
drop of the number of incidents taking place. Consequently, the apparent effectiveness of the 
response suggests that if the incidents had received adequate political attention earlier, a more 
assertive intervention by the police and judiciary could have reduced the number of incidents. 
The reaction of the police and the judiciary thus cannot be reduced to the lack of resources or 
lack of sensitivity at the local level, it had its rationale in the broader political framework. 
Thus, we shall next discuss the reasons for the hesitant and delayed government response. 
 
b) The Government Response  
In early March 2004, three months after the elections, the Serbian parliament finally 
elected Vojislav Koštunica as the new prime minister. Since then he has been presiding over a 
coalition formed by his Democratic Party of Serbia, the liberal party G17+, and the smaller 
coalition of the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO) and New Serbia 
(Nova Srbija, NS). Koštunica’s coalition does not hold a parliamentary majority and has 
relied on the Socialist Party of Serbia for support. After Djindjić’s reformist government, the 
new government has come to represent in many ways a reorientation towards more 
conservative and nationalist policies and a slowdown of the reform process.  
Part of the reason for the initial passivity of state institutions was the interlude between the 
elections in December 2003 and the formation of the new government, when Serbia was 
without an effective government. The care-taker Živković government had been unable to act 
decisively, as it lacked the necessary legitimacy following the dramatic losses of DS in the 
                                            
62  Human Rights Watch, op. cit., pp.16; 46-7. 
 24 
 
December 2003 elections and power struggle within the party, which Zoran Živković lost to 
Boris Tadić.  
The new government represented by Koštunica and deputy prime minister Miroljub 
Labus first responded to the incidents by holding a series of meetings with the leader of the 
SVM, Joszef Kasza. The talks remained declaratory and produced few tangible results. For 
three months this remained the only visible response from Belgrade. In the beginning of July 
2004, the president of the Serbian parliament, Predrag Marković, was the first politician in 
Belgrade to admit that there was a serious problem in Vojvodina. His press release, which 
actually announced the next local elections, noted that the number of the “interethnic 
excesses” in Vojvodina was “worrying”63 and referred to the numbers given in the first MUP 
report.64 Koštunica followed Marković’s example a few days later and condemned all 
ethnically motivated incidents. In his press release he stated that it was “unavoidable to work 
on the prevention of the incidents and on the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
tolerance between the national communities.”65 At the same time, the Minister of Interior 
Dragan Jočić maintained that most of the incidents did not have an interethnic background,66 
and emphasized the fact that perpetrators were school children under “the influence of 
alcohol.”67 In July and August 2004 there was a second round of meetings without results 
between Koštunica and a broader circle of different minority representatives from the 
minority councils. In addition, Rasim Ljajić, the State Union Minister for Human and 
Minority Rights, went to Budapest to meet with Hungarian officials.68
Only in September 2004 did Koštunica visit several towns in Vojvodina to talk with 
officials of the police, the judiciary and the administration. A joint session, as mentioned 
above, of the Serbian parliamentary Committees for Security and for Interethnic Relations 
was held in Subotica on the issue and included representatives from minorities. During the 
discussions a dispute arose on the figures presented by the Interior Minister Dragan Jočić, 
who maintained that there had been only 67 ethnically motivated incidents. The meeting 
produced no further results. Later, in September 2004, Koštunica discussed the issue with 
Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, in Brussels, while 
the President of Serbia and Montenegro Svetozar Marović invited the Hungarian President 
                                            
63  “Lokalni izbori 12. ili 19. septembra,” B92, 9.7.2004. 
64  Marković also asked the local police presidents, local authorities and the mayor of Subotica to report on 
the incidents. The reports were included in the material for the joint session of the two parliamentary 
Committees for Security and National Minorities in Subotica beginning of September.  
65  “Koštunica osudio incidente,” B92, 14.7.2004 
66  “Kasa: Jočić ublažava napade na Mađare,” B92, 24.7.2004; “SVM traži Jočićevu ostavku,” B92, 
5.7.2004.
67  “Dragan Jočić: Groblja su oštećivala uglavnom deca,” Danas, 21.7.2005. 
68  “Koštunica rešava probleme u Vojvodini,” B92, 18.7.2004.  
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Ferenc Madl, who visited Serbia and specifically Vojvodina during a three-day visit in the 
beginning of September. A further response of the government was the establishment of the 
Council of National Minorities, which brings together all the national minority councils with 
key resources ministries.69  
Altogether the reaction of the Koštunica government to the incidents was passive and 
indecisive at least until July 2004, if not in fact until September 2004. Not Koštunica but 
Marković, a member of the government coalition’s more moderate party G17+, was the first 
to address the problem. It remains unclear why Koštunica did not react to the incidents. There 
are a number of  possible reasons for the delayed response. First, the incidents actually began 
during the Živković government, which was weak prior to the elections in December 2003 
and was unable to act decisively between the elections and formation of the new government. 
The incidents in Vojvodina were only one of the pressing issues on the agenda of the 
Koštunica government. It was also confronted with the trial of the murderers of prime 
minister Djindjić, economic and political reforms and cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Second, the government displayed a 
weak and indecisive public profile, especially during its first year in office, due to the often 
contradictory positions of the coalition members on key issues of reform. Thirdly, the 
minority government had to rely on the support from SPS, which made it reluctant to take 
positions which might weaken the backing of the Socialist Party. Finally, the reservations of 
the conservative DSS towards minorities and its opposition to Vojvodina’s autonomy made a 
close cooperation between the government and authorities in Vojvodina and the minority 
parties unlikely. The fact that Koštunica (reluctantly) began to take action against the 
incidents in beginning of September, half a month before local and regional elections in 
Voivodina, suggests that electoral tactics could not explain the weak government response.  
As the Koštunica government failed to condemn the interethnic violence from the start, it 
indirectly contributed to their escalation. First it dealt with the incidents as if they were a–in a 
narrower sense–political problem and tried to reach a solution through talks with the most 
influential representative of the Hungarian minority Kasza. Confronted with increasing 
international attention Koštunica took action and appears to have chosen a double strategy. He 
exerted pressure on the police to treat the incidents with more care and by doing so 
contributed to their decrease. The noticeable change of the police’s attitude indicates that the 
                                            
69  “Premijer Koštunica najavio formiranje saveta nacionalnih manjina,” Danas, 10.9.2004. The council is 
foreseen as a federal-level institution in the FRY law on national minorities, but as national minority 
councils only exist in Serbia, the establishment of  the Serbian council reflected the reality that only 
minorities in Serbia had formed national councils. The Council of National Minorities received a 
secretary, Petar Lađović, but has met only a few times since its establishment. 
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government controls the police and  that indeed earlier, firmer actions could have prevented 
the escalation. But in fact Koštunica downplayed the significance of the incidents in his 
public statements.70 He and other member of the government maintained that the incidents 
were only sporadic and that an internationalization of the issue was unnecessary.71  
The government strategy was aimed at satisfying the international community as well as 
its voters in the upcoming local elections in October 2004. By reducing the significance of the 
incidents it obtained the former, although it could not stop the issue's internationalization. The 
repeated claims that the incidents were only isolated cases failed to convince the international 
community, but were intended for domestic consumption. 
  
c) Reactions in Vojvodina  
The institutions of Vojvodina have only recently regained some of the competences they 
had lost in the late 1980s due to the centralization under Milošević. The province has been 
governed by a reformist government, in power since 2000, and received additional 
competences through the aforementioned Omnibus Law in 2002.72 Nevertheless, the areas of 
responsibility of the provincial authorities remain limited. The provincial institutions are thus 
neither responsible for the police nor for the judiciary and therefore had only limited power to 
act against the incidents. Furthermore, the assembly of Vojvodina is not able to legislate, 
reducing the ability of the province to tailor laws to its specific needs. 
In addition to the response by the Vojvodina branches of Belgrade-based parties which 
largely overlap with those of the headquarters, there is a need to consider the response of the 
provincial institutions and in particular the regionalist and minority parties represented 
therein. Here we consider the response of the regionalist perspective by Nenad Čanak, 
president of the Social Democratic League of Vojvodina and speaker of the Vojvodina 
assembly until late 2004 and the SVM–the main party representing the Hungarian minority in 
                                            
70  “Koštunica: Incidenti su pojedinacni,” B92, 8.9.2004; “Koštunica i Labus o potezu Budimpešte,” B92, 
9.9.2004.  
71  “Ocenjujući etničke probleme u Vojvodini ministar Ljajić je januara 2005. pored ostalog izjavio: »na 
Jugu Srbije smo imali oružani konflikt, a u Vojvodini kafanske tuče, nekada sa elementima etničkog 
konflikta, a nekada klasične tuče ljudi u alkoholisanom stanju, ali su nesumnjivo svi ti incidenti imali 
političke reperkusije. To je poslužilo kao povod za političku i medijsku eksploataciju i 
internacionalizaciju. (...) Ja ne mogu da budem u svim kafanama i da razvađam ljude. (...) Tako da mislim 
da je to jedan naduvan problem i da se to sve više i uviđa u međunarodnoj zajednici. Mnogi predstavnici 
međunarodne zajednice su mi rekli da nisu mogli na prvi zahtev Mađarske koja je ušla u EU da odgovore 
negativno, nego su to pitanje na taj način otvorili, sa dubokom svešću da problem nije onakav kakav se 
predstavlja.«” Vreme, 13.1.2005, p.18, cited in Centre for the Development of Civil Society, Vojvodina 
posle internationalizacije, Zrenjanin 2005. 
72  See for an English version of the document: www.osce.org/documents/fry/2002/02.123_en.pdf. 
 27 
 
Vojvodina, headed by Jószef Kasza, deputy prime minister in the Djindjić and Živković 
governments. 
As the main autonomist party, the LSV had taken a consistently critical position of the 
Belgrade authorities during the Milošević period and generally pursued a minority-friendly 
policy. However, Nenad Čanak did not take a firm attitude towards the incidents and their 
internationalization. On one hand he sharply criticized the Belgrade government for its 
passive reaction to the interethnic violence and demanded the resignation of Koštunica and 
Jočić. On the other hand he maintained in December 2004 that the incidents were only bar 
brawls that had been instrumentalized for political means.73 Čanak is the strongest advocate 
of Vojvodina’s autonomy and has been trying to internationalize the issue of regional 
autonomy for years. One might have expected that the anti-minority incidents would have 
offered a good occasion for Čanak to raise the question of autonomy in the international 
arena, which he did when he met with a delegation of the Council of Europe in September 
2004. If Vojvodina controlled the police and the judiciary, Čanak noted, the problem of 
interethnic incidents would be resolved.74 Surprisingly, on other occasions Čanak did not 
support the internationalization and criticized the Hungarian minority institutions and the 
SVM for doing so. “History has shown,” Čanak noted “that every time a mother state tried to 
internationalize the situation of its diaspora, it had bad effects on the diaspora itself. I 
wouldn’t draw the parallel to the events ten, fifteen years ago, when it was said that the Serbs 
in Knin had to be protected. We all know how this ended.”75 To understand his ambivalent 
attitude towards internationalization it helps to examine inter-party relations in Vojvodina. 
Čanak’s LSV and the SVM, as well as the Sandžak Democratic Party (Sandžačka 
demokratska partija, SDP) of the State Union Minister for Human and Minority Rights, 
Rasim Ljajić, participated together in the coalition Zajedno za toleranciju (Together for 
Tolerance) in the parliamentary elections in December 2003. The coalition failed to pass the 5 
percent threshold and as a consequence the parties which had been previously represented in 
parliament lost their seats. The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians formed closer ties to the 
Democratic Party, cooperating and supporting each other’s candidates in the local elections 
and provincial elections in 2004.76 This is has been one of the reasons why Čanak’s coalition 
Zajedno za Vojvodinu (Together for Vojvodina) lost in the local elections, winning only seven 
                                            
73  Public discussion organized by the Robert-Bosch-Stiftung, Novi Sad, 28.11.2004.  
74  “Čanak za vojvodjansku policiju,” B92, 6.9.2004.  
75  “Čanak kritikuje Beograd i Budimpeštu, ” B92, 18.8.2004. 
76  “Zajedno na izborima. Potpisan protocol o straškoj saradnji DS i SVM,” Dnevnik, 15.5.2004. 
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seats in the Vojvodina assembly.77 The response of the LSV and Nenad Čanak thus has to be 
viewed through the prism of the split between the largest minority party and the largest 
autonomy party. This development has largely been a consequence of the faltering support for 
autonomist parties, making them a less desirable partner for minorities. The alliance between 
autonomists and minority parties has never been as tight as it might at first appear. The 
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, as well as some other Hungarian parties, have been 
contemplating the idea of either a Hungarian cultural autonomy or territorial autonomy of the 
municipalities in mostly Northern Bačka which are predominantly inhabited by Hungarians. 
More autonomy for Vojvodina alone, considering the Serb pre-dominance has thus been seen 
as being insufficient for the minority. In the government of Vojvodina, however, autonomists, 
the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians and Democratic Party continued to form the governing 
coalition even after the 2004 elections.  
 
d) The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 
The issue of the incidents was first raised by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, the 
largest Hungarian Party. Its president Jószef Kasza was deputy prime minister in the Serbian 
government as part of the DOS coalition 2001-2004, but, as mentioned earlier, lost his 
position as deputy prime minister and his party failed to clear the 5 percent threshold in the 
December 2003 elections.  
Already in April 2004 Kasza called on Hungary to use its weight as a future member of 
the EU to put pressure on Serbia in regard to the treatment of minorities and characterized the 
incidents as ‘atrocities’.78 This term was later also adopted by the Hungarian foreign minister 
and Hungarian lobby groups.79 Kasza furthermore declared a very high number of incidents80 
and in some occasions even accused the Serbian state or the Serbian secret service 
respectively of supporting the incidents.81 The dominant role of Kasza in drawing attention to 
the incidents resulted in a situation where the incidents were first addressed in bilateral 
meetings between Kasza and representatives from the Serbian government. After Deputy 
Prime Minister Miroljub Labus had met with Kasza once, Koštunica discussed the issue with 
                                            
77  The DS has now 34 seats and the SVM 11 seats. In the provincial elections 2000 Čanak's LSV 
participated as a part of the DOS coalition and gained 24 seats. 
78  RFE/RL Newsline, 30.4.2004. 
79  Nicholas Wood, ‘Attacks Against the Hungarian Minority in Serbia Are Increasing,’ New York Times, 
17.9.2004. 
80  “Kasa: Vlada ne sprečava incidente,” B92, 25.8.2004.  
81  “If the investigating organs, if the BIA cannot find the perpetrators, then they are the perpetrators 
themselves. The agency has done such work before,” “Kasa optužio BIA za pojavu nacionalistickih 
grafita,” B92, 2.4.2004. On another occasion he described the incidents as “organized actions with the 
aim to put the members of the minorities under physical and psychical pressure.” “Vlada da spreči napade 
na manjine,” B92, 10.7.2004; see also “Napadi na Madjare uz podršku vlada,” B92, 10.6.2004.  
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Kasza at least twice in 2004. Both meetings were followed by a dispute between the two on 
what had been agreed upon. According to Kasza, they agreed in the first meeting in April 
2004 that changes of local authorities such as the heads of the police, judges and prosecutors, 
would be made only with the consent of the local administration. Kasza publicly complained 
that Koštunica failed to keep the agreement. According to him, just a few days after their 
meeting all heads of the police in Vojvodina had been replaced, without discussing or even 
informing the local governments.82 After the second meeting in July 2004, Kasza maintained 
that they had agreed to form a multiethnic police in Vojvodina’s regions that included 
significant shares of national minorities.83 Koštunica on the other hand immediately denied 
this.84 It remains unclear if and what kind of consent had been reached in these meetings, but 
it is unlikely that Koštunica would agree to an interethnic police force in Vojvodina. Kasza 
never went into detail but the interethnic police force was associated with the one established 
in southern Serbia after the end of the conflict in 2001 with international assistance. 
Considering the establishment of this force as a post-conflict measure, suggests that a similar 
police reform in Vojvodina would have been exaggerated and even problematic.85 Even less 
imaginable is the idea of Koštunica sharing the competencies of Belgrade concerning police 
and judiciary with the local governments in Vojvodina. The meetings had little impact on 
either convincing the government to change its policy nor did they result in a rapprochement 
between minority representatives and government. More problematical, it transformed the 
incidents into a topic of political negotiations, rather than one of state effectiveness and 
minority rights.  
Early on, the SVM sought not only a dialogue with the Serbian government, but also 
involved Hungary as kin state. Already by April 2004 Kasza had met with the president of the 
Hungarian parliament in Budapest to discuss the incidents. The internationalization of the 
incidents with the support of the kin state can be interpreted both as a reaction to the 
originally weak state response and as a strategy to increase electoral support for the party 
within the Hungarian community. Kasza incorporated the incidents into his pre-election 
campaign and attempted to mobilize the Hungarians to vote in the September 2004 local and 
provincial elections. 
                                            
82  “Šta zamera Koštunici da nije poštovao dogovor s SVM,” B92, 21.4.2004. 
83  “Multietnička policija ideja Kostunice,“ B92, 17.7.2004.  
84  The press release states that in the meeting the importance of minorities’ participation in all state and 
public functions had only been discussed, see B92, 15.7.2004. 
85  The establishment of a multiethnic police in Southern Serbia as a conflict management tool often 
subordinated quality to inclusion. Furthermore, there has been criticism of weakness of the force in regard 
to the omnipresent Gendarmerie (Žandarmerija), a special police unit which maintains a strong presence 
in the region. 
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Map 1: Strongest Parties in the Vojvodina Elections, September 200486
The results show that the SVM failed in this strategy, losing in the local and provincial 
elections in September 2004. In Subotica, the SVM lost nearly half of its 30 seats dropping to 
16 seats in the town council, as did the main Croat party, the Democratic Alliance of Croats in 
Vojvodina (Demokratski savez Hrvata u Vojvodini, DSHV), losing 7 of its previous 12 
seats.87 Throughout Vojvodina, the support for the SVM declined sharply, losing 7 of its 18 
seats in the Vojvodina assembly and Hungarian minority parties provide mayors in four 
instead of previously eight municipalities.88  
The political instrumentalization of the incidents has not only been (unsurprisingly) criticized 
by Serbian authorities and media, but also by other minority representatives and other 
Hungarian parties, in particular by the Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians 
(Demokratska stranka vojvođanskih Mađara, DSVM) of András Ágoston.  
 
e) The Kin State and International Response 
The international response to the incidents has been shaped by the strong international 
scrutiny Serbia faces in the field of interethnic relations and the influential role of Hungary as 
a kin state taking full advantage of its newly gained membership in the European Union. After 
the incidents were first raised by the SVM, the Hungarian government addressed the problems 
in Vojvodina several times in the form of inquiries with the Serbian and State Union 
governments. After the failure of addressing the incidents on the bilateral level, the Hungarian 
                                            
86  Adapted from “Radikali najjači, demokratski blok većinski,” Dnevnik, 21.9.2005. 
87  “Policija u izbornoj komisiji,” Dnevnik, 22.9.2004. 
88  Jan Briza, “Srbi i Madjari nisu u zavadi,” Dnevnik, 10.10.2004. 
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government began involving international organizations, in particular the EU and the Council 
of Europe. This process of kin state involvement accelerated in June 2004.89 The Hungarian 
Interior Minister Monika Lamperth noted during her visit to Subotica that the Hungarian 
government was forced to report Serbia and Montenegro to the Council of Europe if the 
situation in Vojvodina did not improve.90 In addition to the government of Hungary, the 
opposition, led by the conservative party Fidesz also took up the issue of the incidents.  
Hungarian members of the European Parliament (EP) issued a draft resolution on 
Vojvodina which was passed in mid-September. Although the EP did not use the term 
‘atrocities’ as suggested in the draft,91 it sharply condemned the situation in Vojvodina. It 
spoke of the ongoing intimidation of minorities, especially of the Hungarians, and expressed 
its concern that the Serbian authorities have been ignoring the incidents and violating 
fundamental human and minority rights. The EP reminded Serbia and Montenegro that the 
protection of human and minority rights is a basic precondition for the continuation of the 
Stabilization and Association Process with the EU.92 The second international organization 
which dealt with the issue was the Council of Europe (CoE). Since Serbia and Montenegro 
had been accepted only conditionally in 2003, the organization has been issuing regular 
reports monitoring the progress of Serbia and Montenegro in the field of democratization and 
human rights. The Secretary General addressed the problems in Vojvodina in his information 
on “Compliance with obligations and commitments and implementation of the post-accession 
co-operation programme” in September and December 2004. Additionally, the Committee of 
the Ministers of the CoE adopted a resolution in November 2004, warning that the “protection 
of national minorities should receive greater attention from law-enforcement agencies 
regarding especially the effective investigation and prevention of violent incidents recently 
committed against persons belonging to Hungarian and some other national minorities.”93 A 
resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also took up the issue of 
                                            
89  In this month an American congressman of Hungarian origin started to make the problems of the 
Hungarians in Vojvodina public. The SVM informed the Helsinki committee in Washington about the 
incidents. The Hungarian Minister of Defense said that if the problem were not going to be solved they 
would request a examination of the issue in the European Council. See “SVM o napadima na madjarsku 
manjinu,” B92, 23.6.2004. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade wrote a open letter and 
attached to this a list of anti-minority incidents. The Centre for the Development of Civil Society 
mentions in its report Vojvodina posle internationalizacije as the beginning of the internationalization 6 
July, when the head of the OSCE mission, Mauricio Massari, addressed the issue, see also B92, 
15.7.2004. 
90  See “Sve češći napadi na nacionalne manjine,” B92, 21.6.2004.  
91  See “Motion for a Resolution tabled for the debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure by Isván Szent-Ivanyi and Jelko Kacin on 
behalf of the ALDE Group on the continuing atrocities against minorities in the province of Vojvodina, 
Serbia and Montenegro.”  
92  European Parliament, Vojvodina: harassment of minorities, 16.9.2004.  
93  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, ResCMN(2004)12, 17.11.2004, see https://wcm.coe.int. 
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the incidents in Vojvodina and called on the Serbian authorities to properly investigate these 
and sanction perpetrators. Furthermore, it warned against “all attempts to politically exploit 
interethnic tensions for political  purposes, whether locally or internationally.”94  
The strategy of internationalization chosen by Kasza and both the Hungarian 
government and opposition had several effects. International pressure contributed largely to 
the decrease anti-minority violence. The sharp decline of the incidents in October 2004 
clearly coincides with the increased international pressure and the response by the 
government. 
On the other hand, the internationalization contributed to the ongoing processes of 
radicalization of the Serbian majority and polarization of society in Vojvodina. The negative 
impact of the internationalization on the perceptions of the majority are visible when 
analyzing the media response, as will be done in the next section. The direct link between the 
internationalization and the Radical party victory in the 2004 elections is more difficult to 
assess due to a lack of clear empirical data. The SRS improved its election results in 
Vojvodina already in December 2003, i.e. before the interethnic violence increased, receiving 
31.88 % of the voters’ support, 6 % more than in Central Serbia. In the second round of the 
presidential election in 2004, however, the Radicals’ candidate Tomislav Nikolić was 
supported less in Vojvodina than in Central Serbia (43.16% in Vojvodina, 45.84% in Central 
Serbia). After the provincial elections in September 2004 the party gained 36 seats in the 
provincial assembly, more than any other party. It is altogether plausible that the incidents 
contributed to the success of the SRS. The European Parliament certainly did not do moderate 
forces in Vojvodina a favor by passing its resolution only a few days before the provincial and 
local elections.    
Arguably, the successful internationalization of the incidents on behalf of the SVM has 
been an encouragement to other minorities to voice grievances more prominently. At the same 
time the dynamics of the discourse around the incidents in Vojvodina have already polarized 
the Serb majority. In late October 2005, the main Croat political party, the Democratic 
Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina, accused the government of tolerating discrimination against 
Croats. The party particularly suggested that Croats are discriminated against in public 
service, as well as in regard to the use of language and by the recognition of the Bunjevci, a 
community Croats suggest are actually Croats.95 In the most recent case, a number of deputies 
                                            
94  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1397, Functioning of the democratic institutions 
in Serbia and Montenegro, 2004. 
95  “DSHV tvrdi da država odgaja ksenofobiju i neprijatljstvo prema drugim nacijama,“ Dnevnik, 
25.10.2005. 
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in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe initiated a resolution to condemn the 
Serbian government for “an artificial separation between the Romanians of Vojvodina and the 
Romanians of eastern Serbia by refusing to recognize the latter group's self-designated ethnic 
identification (Romanians) and imposing the ethnic tag of ‘Vlachs’ on them,” and for not 
protecting the rights of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia.96 The response of the 
Serbian media is unsurprising. The tabloid Blic in response asks suggestively “And now 
Serbia is breaking the rights of Romanians?!”97 Altogether, one can agree with the words of 
the Hungarian Council’s Secretary, László Varga: “Internationalization wasn’t a good 
solution, but it was the only one.”98  The dominant role of the kin state and the non-systematic 
and rather ad-hoc interest the incidents received thus tainted the international intervention and 
in fact raises larger questions about the ability of international organizations to effectively 
address such incidents. 
f) The Media  
The media was a key actor in creating an atmosphere that fostered anti-minority 
violence. Both underreporting on minorities and the incidents, as well as a nationalist 
discourse and world view in large parts of the mainstream media account for the significance 
of the media in the context of the incidents in Vojvodina and their social importance. A 
particular phenomenon is the spread of tabloids with strong nationalist messages and a 
tendency to sensationalize politics. The lack of clear ownership structure of many media and 
the inadequate implementation of laws against hate speech contribute to the negative role 
media play.99  
For the purpose of this study, the popular tabloid Večernje novosti was chosen to 
illustrate the reaction of the Belgrade media toward the anti-minority incidents. The daily with 
a circulation about 270,000100 is together with Kurir the main tabloid with a strong 
conservative and nationalist point of view. The coverage of Večernje novosti is compared to 
the coverage of two other newspapers, the liberal quality daily Danas from Belgrade and the 
regional daily Dnevnik from Novi Sad, both with an estimate circulation of 20,000. 
The violence in Vojvodina only received limited attention from the Belgrade media and 
only came to the foreground after the incidents had been ongoing for several months. Danas 
                                            
96  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Draft Resolution, Violation of the human rights of the 
Romanian ethnic minority in Serbia, Doc. 10726, 17.10.2005. 
97  “Sad Srbija krši i prava Rumuna?!,” Blic, 2.11.2005. 
98  Interview in Subotica, 3.3.2004.  
99  Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, The Press: an Unchanged Matrix, Belgrade, December 2004. The 
research included ten Serbian newspapers from March-August 2004.  
100  There is no independent data on the print run of media. According to Večernje Novosti, the average 
circulation in 2004 was 271.175. “Rastu: Tiraž, dobit, prihod...,” Večernje Novosti, 28.2.2005. 
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began reporting on the incidents for the first time in June 2004 on the occasion of a statement 
of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, which warned in a public letter against 
interethnic violence in Vojvodina. Even the daily Dnevnik from Novi Sad reported 
astonishingly little on the issue. Nevertheless, both Danas and Dnevnik are exceptions in the 
Serb media scene. The huge majority of the media did not notice or ignored the anti-minority 
trend and in fact failed to inform and warn the public.101 Večernje novosti addressed the 
problem for the first time in August 2004 but it only devoted more attention in September 
2004 as did most of the Serbian press. According to the Helsinki Committee, “the Belgrade 
press started covering them [the anti-minority incidents] only in September when the issue 
was internationalized.”102 There was, however, one exception. Already by the end of June 
2004 one incident from Vojvodina made its way into the headlines of Belgrade media. 
However, here the victim was a Serb. The case of the Serb Zoran Petrović who was beaten up 
in the small town Temerin north of Novi Sad occupied the public debate for weeks. The case 
became so important that even the Minister for Human and Minority Rights, Rasim Ljajić, 
visited Petrović in hospital to determine whether the fight had an ethnic motivation.103
On 26 June 2004, a Saturday morning, policemen found Petrović on the street critically 
injured and unconscious. He was rushed to hospital and a few hours later five young 
Hungarians were arrested. The suspects confessed that they had beaten up Petrović because he 
had molested their female friend. Until this point the case did not seem particularly 
uncommon. Unusual was what the perpetrators had done to Petrović who was found naked 
with a wooden rod in the anus, the pubic hair burned and dirtied with urine. Probably these 
circumstances attracted the attention of Večernje novosti who brought a short report on the 
incident the following Monday. The nationality of the victim and the perpetrators was 
mentioned but was not referred to as a motive for the attack. The incident was rather 
presented as a criminal act, a local scandal which only because of repulsive details gained 
short media attention and was to be forgotten the next day.104 Some Serbian politicians, 
however, appear to have recognized the possibility to instrumentalize the case and asserted a 
nationalistic background. The DSS compared it with the notorious Martinović case, which 
inflamed the Serbian public in the 1980s over the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo.105 The SPO 
                                            
101  Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, op. cit., p.17. 
102  Ibid., p.18. 
103  The Minister’s intent was to calm the situation and to stress that the incident had no nationalistic 
background. But by visiting Petrović he also gave the case an importance that it did not deserve and 
contributed to additional public attention.  
104  “Pronađen nag sa džakom na glavi,” Večernje novosti, 28.6.2004. 
105  Djordje Martinović was a Serb farmer in Kosovo who was rushed in May 1985 to hospital to remove a 
broken beer bottle from his anus. Martinović claimed that he had been the victim of masked Albanians, 
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was convinced that the incident was a reaction of Hungarians who had expected a victory of 
the Radicals’ candidate Tomislav Nikolić in the Serbian presidential election. The Hungarian 
perpetrators, according to a rather incoherent statement of the SPO, had hoped for an increase 
of interethnic tensions and were disappointed after the victory of the moderate Boris Tadić.106 
Nikolić himself complained that the police informed the public only after the elections and 
maintained that knowledge on the Petrović case would have improved his results in the 
elections. Considering this response, the day after the first short article, Večernje novosti 
reported in detail on the case and quoted the reactions of politicians which drew attention to 
an interethnic background. In addition, Večernje novosti included long interviews with the 
mother and the girlfriend of Petrović. In the course of the interviews it became obvious that 
the fight was not ethnically motivated. Večernje novosti is fair enough to admit this and did 
not directly question the Petrović’s credibility who – as soon as he had regained 
consciousness – denied any nationalistic background of the incident.107 Večernje novosti’s 
rival Kurir took a very different line, maintaining that the nationalistic background had been 
suppressed. According to Kurir, Petrović not able to remember the night of the fight and 
assess the motivation of the perpetrators due to his injuries. Kurir also mentioned Hungarian 
nationalist graffiti108 near the spot Petrović was found and suggested a connection between 
the fight and the graffiti. Kurir omitted to report that the graffiti had been there long before 
Petrović was beaten up. In summary: a common attack or fight was instrumentalized first by 
Serbian politicians and then by the Serbian media in order to show that the Serb majority was 
under threat, not the minorities. This interpretation fits in the larger pattern of the Serbian 
media coverage which perpetuates a “sense of self-pity and a feeling of permanent 
endangerment.”109 Although Večernje novosti acknowledged that the incident had no ethnic 
background, most of its readers will remember it vaguely as a case were a Serb was beaten up 
by five Hungarians.110  
In September 2004 the internationalization of the incidents reached its peak: the 
European Parliament and the Council of Europe discussed the issue, premier Koštunica met 
                                                                                                                                        
who had tied him up and inflicted the injury on him. Albanian sources, however, maintained that 
Martinović was a homosexual who had injured himself accidentally. See Julie Mertus, Kosovo. How 
Myths and Truths Started a War. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999, 
pp. 95-121. 
106  Before constructing this argument the SPO should have had a closer look at the timetable: Petrović was 
beaten up a day before the elections which were held on 27 June 2004. 
107  See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, op. cit., p.95. 
108  “I believe in God, I believe in one homeland. I believe in one God's justice, I believe in resurrection of 
Hungary. Amen.” 
109  Ibid., p.6. 
110  For some people Petrović became a second Martinović figure. In Novi Sad at a match some fans had a 
transparent saying: “Temerin. Osveta. Veternik.”, “Provokacije,” Večernje novosti, 6.9.2004. 
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with Javier Solana and the Hungarian president Ferenc Mádl came to Belgrade and Vojvodina 
on a three-day visit. One of the first consequences of the internationalization was the fact that 
the Belgrade media could no longer ignore the issue and had to report on the anti-minority 
violence in Serbia’s northern province. In addition, the approaching elections of Vojvodina’s 
assembly attracted further attention. Unfortunately the internationalization hardly had a 
positive influence on the way in which the media reported on the issue. Večernje novosti 
reacted to the increasing international pressure more and more aggressively in their coverage 
and developed several strategies in argumentation in order to support the nationalistic 
spectrum in  Serb society.  
First, Večernje novosti argued that the incidents were not a widespread phenomenon but 
isolated cases. According to the daily, the citizens of Vojvodina learned about existing ethnic 
tension in the newspapers, not from their everyday life.111  
Second, Večernje novosti reversed cause and consequence. The incidents, so one of its 
recurring arguments, were the results of the power politics of the Vojvodina Hungarian 
political elite. After the SVM had lost their seats in Belgrade’s parliament, it instrumentalized 
isolated anti-minority incidents in order to gain influence and support. In the first sentence of 
the first article on the issue which appeared in August, Kasza and Čanak are accused of 
having fanned interethnic tensions by internationalizing the incidents.112 The harsh Kasza- 
(and to a lesser extent Čanak) bashing is part of almost every article in Večernje novosti on 
the issue. While in power, argues Večernje novosti, Kasza failed to care about minority rights 
and only discovered this concern after losing in the 2003 elections.  
 Third, the internationalization is considered as a strategy of Kasza to strengthen Hungarian 
autonomy in Vojvodina or even secessionism which Kasza allegedly supports. Consequently, 
internationalization is discredited and equated with secessionism. At times, the fear that 
Vojvodina can become a similar problem like The Hague or Kosovo is articulated.113  
                                            
111  “Nije svaka tuća rat,” Večernje novosti, 06.09.2004; “Sukovi obavezno uoči izbora,” Večernje novosti, 
7.9.2004. 
112  “Status Vojvodine srpsko-srpsko pitanje,” Večernje novosti, 08.08.2004. Its very unlikely that Kasza and 
Čanak did a statement together on the issue as they did not share the same view (see above).  
113  Before the internationalization of anti-minority incidents in Vojvodina made its way to the headlines of 
the Belgrade press, the internationalization of Vojvodina’s autonomy was fiercely discussed on occasion 
of the so-called Subotica initiative. By means of this initiative the leader of Vojvodina’s League of 
Socialdemocrats Čanak tried to obtain international support to reconstruct Vojvodina’s autonomy in 
March 2004. Although his initiative was without success an intensive bashing of “autonomy-minded” 
started in Belgrade. Conspiracy theories about the European Union (and especially Germany) supporting 
alleged separatist movements in Vojvodina were spread and still appear frequently in different media and 
the internationalisation of the anti-minority incidents is associated with these.  
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 Fourth, ‘attack is the best form of defense’ has been the strategy when Večernje novosti 
published the article “Manjina sve manja.” In this article and on other occasions the daily 
accused Hungary of discrimination against the Serb minority in Hungary.  
The internationalization forced Večernje novosti to report on anti-minority violence but at 
the same time opened up the possibility to focus its coverage on the process of 
internationalization. Večernje novosti never discussed in depth the incidents and their cause or 
possible measure to improve interethnic relations in Vojvodina. For Večernje novosti and its 
readers “the problem,” as the DSS member of parliament Željko Tomić puts it, “is not a lack 
of tolerance, but the Hungarian politician Kasza.”114  
 
5. Conclusions 
The increased number of incidents against minorities in 2004 drew renewed attention to 
nationalism and volatile minority-majority relations in Serbia. The renewed international 
interest, including the September 2005 resolution of the European Parliament in fact confused 
the situation in Vojvodina in 2005, as the intensity of the incidents had long subsided.  
 Both NGOs, the State Union Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and the Provincial 
Secretariat for Legislation, Administration and National Minorities noted a marked decrease 
of anti-minority incidents since October 2004 (see table below). In 2005, the number of 
incidents has been more than five times lower than in the previous year, even though data 
suggests that the level is still higher than in 2003.  
 Table 6: Incidents directed against the Hungarian Minority115
 
Types of Incidents 2003 2004 1-8/2005 
1. Physical Attacks 0 8 0 
2. Fights 2 8 2 
3. Damage to objects of the catholic church 1 6 2 
4. Damage to catholic graves  11 17 6 
5. Graffiti and distribution of pamphlets 3 25 3 
Considering this sharp drop, attention should focus primarily on whether the right lessons 
have been learnt from the incidents in 2004 to prevent or at least effectively combat such an 
increase in violence in the future. In conclusion, we shall focus on a) the importance of the 
                                            
114  Željko Tomić, Interview, DSS, MP, Member of the Parliamentary Committee for Interethnic Relations, 
16.3.2005. 
115  Source: Ministry for Human and Minority Rights. 
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incidents and what they mean for Serbia and b) what measures have and need to be 
undertaken to prevent a renewed escalation. 
 
The incidents reveal the tentative nature of progress in the field of ethnic relations in Serbia 
since the fall of the Milošević regime. This working paper makes the argument that the 
incidents should not be overly dramatized and seen as part of an organized plan against 
minorities, but at the same time should not be merely considered a weakening hold-over from 
the Milošević era. Altogether the ethnically motivated acts shed light on the state, Serbian 
society and the protection of minorities, as well as on the function of internationalization in 
reducing interethnic tensions.  
 
a) The Role of the State  
After having been the primary source of minority rights violations for a decade, public 
authorities, first and foremost the police, found itself in the curious position of protecting the 
rights of minorities. Although institutional inertia, underrepresentation of minorities (and their 
concerns) and opposition among members of police and judiciary can partially explain the 
passivity in the first months, the responsibility falls to decision-makers. Once the government 
took a more assertive line in regard to the violence, the number of incidents dropped off and 
police action and judicial procedures increased. The strong role of a passive government 
indicates both the primacy of politics over rule of law, but also points to the reluctance of 
some elected officials to recognize the seriousness of the incidents. Underestimating the 
international and interethnic repercussions of a weak state response cannot be explained 
exclusively through passivity itself, but is anchored both in a deep-rooted skepticism towards 
minorities, the accompanying nation state paradigm and the lack of sensitivity towards 
interethnic relations. This problem is particularly striking in Serbia due to the fact that 
diversity is concentrated in regions (parts of Vojvodina, Sandžak, Southern Serbia, etc.) and 
frequently not perceived in Belgrade.  
The change of state policy as a result of external pressure compounds the general 
reservation toward externally imposed policies—in particular in the field of minority rights—
and the weakness of domestic reform processes.  
 
b) Incidents and Minority Rights 
The incidents point to a dilemma. Much emphasis by the EU, the Council of Europe and 
other international organizations in recent years has been on strengthening minority rights 
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regimes in the Western Balkans to overcome the legacy of nationalism and exclusion. 
Arguably, Serbia has introduced extremely positive legal measures to protect minority rights. 
Implementation and legal details have lacked in Serbia, as is the case of similar regimes in the 
region (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina). In Vojvodina, however, minority rights have been 
considerably better protected than in the rest of Serbia due to an established tradition of 
minority rights and the transfer of competences to the province after the fall of Milošević in 
the field of education, among others. The incidents at the same time suggest that improving 
the protection of minority rights in itself is insufficient to improve interethnic relations. 
Although the incidents triggered (reasonable) demands from some minority groups for better 
defined minority rights, the remedy for incidents is not minority rights. While some domestic 
institutions and international organizations recognized the importance of tolerance and 
interethnic communication, this aspect of improving majority-minority relations has been 
neglected. Minority language schooling or curricula are only useful in a context where 
majority children do not learn only the negative stereotypes about minorities.116  Closely 
linked is the weakness of the international minority rights system, represented primarily by 
the Council of Europe, which was unable to exercise any pressure on Serbia and Montenegro 
to take action against the incidents. The European Union, despite lacking standards and a 
serious monitoring regime in regard to human and minority rights, was much more effective 
due to lobbying by a member state, Hungary.  
 
c) The Role of Society  
It would be false to extrapolate the general state of society in Vojvodina from some 200 
incidents over three years. Nevertheless, the incidents are indicative of larger social problems 
which this paper has sought to identify. First, the nationalist orientation among teens and 
youth in their early twenties and the parallel lives minorities and majorities lead in parts of 
Vojvodina. 
The fact that the 15-25 year olds make up nearly all of the caught perpetrators of the 
incidents and that the same age group in Serbia holds more ethnocentric views and has been 
more isolated than older citizens is alarming. Considering the 1990s, this might not be 
surprising. Yet, considering that 18 year olds will have had a good share of their education 
after the end of the Milošević regime and were 12 when NATO bombed Serbia, 8 when the 
Dayton Peace Accords were signed, 4 when Yugoslavia broke apart and born the year 
                                            
116  See Conference Report, Preparing for Europe: Education for National Minorities in Serbia and 
Montenegro, 9-11.11. 2005, Wilton Park Conference WPS05/17. Available at: 
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/themes/regions/pastconference.aspx?confref=WPS05/17.  
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Milošević came to power. As the response of media and political elites indicate, are 
nationalist views present and legitimate in public discourse. The weak public condemnation 
of the incidents by large parts of the media and political elites only reaffirmed the legitimacy 
of this type of expression. Furthermore, the incidents constitute a repertoire of acts, 
amalgamented from the symbols and patterns of behavior legitimized in the wars of the 1990s 
and the social frustration of the transition period. 
In addition, the incidents highlighted the emergence of parallel lives between minorities 
and majorities in Vojvodina.117 This ‘parallelism’ has been a feature of minority-majority 
relations in parts of Serbia for decades. In particular in Kosovo, a near complete division of 
public life of Serbs and Albanians has shaped the region at least since 1990, if not earlier. 
Similar problems have also arisen in Sandžak. The segmentation of public life is the 
consequence of ethnic distance and stereotypes, as well as structural and institutional 
divisions. Vojvodina has  traditionally not been marked by this type of social divisions 
between communities, with the exception of Roma, who are segregated from mainstream 
society throughout the country. The incidents in Vojvodina indicate a worrying change. In 
large parts of Vojvodina, the life of minority and majority members runs on parallel tracks 
with few meeting points. The incidents often bore witness to this trend: bar fights most 
frequently focused on Serbs attacking Hungarians at a bar/club/discotheque associated with 
Hungarians (or vice-versa). Fights between groups of youth took on an ‘ethnic’ dimension 
exactly because social ties have become more mono-ethnic. Thus, conflicts which have little 
to do with ethnicity quickly take on ethnic features, as social group divisions coincide with 
ethnic belonging.  
 
d) Internationalization and the Dialogue of the Deaf 
There has been a close correlation between the sharp drop of the incidents and 
internationalization of the issue in October 2004. It is certainly impossible to determine 
conclusively whether the international interest was the primary cause in reducing the 
incidents. However, there is little doubt that the police began taking the incidents more 
seriously and conducting more arrests and thorough investigations after both Hungary and 
international organizations took note. Ironically, while the internationalization might have had 
a positive impact on the conduct of state institutions, it most certainly had negative 
repercussions on the social perception of the problem and probably contributed to the 
polarization of society. The negative reaction of Serbian media to the international interest in 
                                            
117  Centre for the Development of Civil Society, Novi etnički sukobi u Vojvodini, Zrenjanin, August 2004. 
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minority issues and the fear of ‘internationalization’, as well as the often categorical rejection 
of criticism by domestic political elites, has further consolidated the negative view of external 
intervention. The fact that much of the international interest was triggered by intervention of 
the kin state and international organizations themselves struggled with a nuanced approach to 
the problem further worsened the perception.  
6. Next Steps 
Responses to the incidents have not all been negative, but also triggered more innovative 
initiatives in Vojvodina, which are likely to address some of the root causes. The only 
concrete initiative to date has come from the Vojvodina Secretariat for Legislation, 
Administration and National Minorities. It focuses on promoting grass-roots activities 
targeted at improving interethnic relations, in particular among pupils. The project for 
“Promotion of multiculturalism and tolerance in Vojvodina”118 was launched in September 
2005 with support from the government of Hungary, the USA embassy, the OSCE mission 
and a private company (Bambi), but without support from the republican institutions.119 The 
project comprises several smaller initiatives such as a media campaign for multiculturalism, a 
quiz about minorities’ tradition and history, a sporting “cup of tolerance,” targeting mostly 
pupils.120 Considering a budget of only some 23 million Dinars (270.000 Euros), the project 
can only constitute a small step. A broader initiative is clearly needed to prevent repetition of 
the violence.  
The sensitive status discussions over Kosovo and continued strong support for the Radical 
party in Serbia suggest that there is no reason to believe that the incidents of 2004 cannot 
repeat themselves in the same or greater intensity. A stronger police response and prosecution 
by the courts/judicial system is only one aspect of addressing the incidents. Without the 
emergence of an alternative value system, punishment alone might quell the extreme 
expressions of intolerance but it cannot address the root causes. 
  
                                            
118  A problem of the proposal is the uncritical use of the term “multiculturalism” which is used throughout 
the whole proposal. Neither a closer understanding or definition of this concept is given nor its limits and  
problems are discussed. A more critical dealing of the terms “multiculturalism” and “tolerance” is 
therefore necessary. Considering the uncritical use of the term multiculturalism in considerably less 
multicultural regions such as Kosovo by international organizations makes this less surprising. 
119  Centre for the Development of Civil Society, Etnički incidenti u Vojvodini. Zrenjanin, 25.11.2005. 
120  Provincial Secretary for Legislation, Administration and National Minorities. 2005. Project. Promotion of 
Multiculturalism and Tolerance in Vojvodina, Novi Sad, February. Some of the proposals run the risk of 
replacing old with new stereotypes, such as emphasizing the “joint resistance against the Turkish 
invasion.” 
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